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Abstract
During the last four decades, dominant theories of comprehension and cognition
have ignored affect. In the meantime, several psychologists, social
psychologists, and neurophysiologists have independently had a remarkable
impact on theory and research concerning important affective variables.
Recently, there has been a surge in attention on the structural aspects of
emotions. But structural models have been slow in incorporating the
traditional research on affect. Structural theories seek to characterize
abstract psychological structures, but the research on affect seems to be more
consistent with the view that affect is a functional rather than a structural
phenomenon. This paper attempts to present a coherent account of affect based
on the functional properties of the nervous system. It is assumed that
emotions are created by the simultaneous activity of various components of the
neuronal system and that emotional structures persist only as long as the
underlying neuronal elements remain in a state of functioning. Some empirical
implications of the functional view are also discussed.
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Affect: A Functional Perspective
During the last four decades, dominant theories of comprehension and
cognition--information processing theories, stimulus-response theories, and
schema theories--have ignored affect. In a recent article, Zajonc (1980)
points out:
Contemporary cognitive psychology simply ignores affect. The words
affect, attitude, feeling, and sentiment do not appear in the indexes of
any of the major works on cognition (Anderson, 1976; Anderson & Bower,
1973; Bobrow & Collins, 1975; Crowder, 1976; Kintsch, 1974; Lachman,
Lachman, & Butterfield, 1979; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Schank & Abelson,
1977; Tulving & Donaldson, 1972). Nor do these concepts appear in
Neisser's (1967) original work that gave rise to the cognitive revolution
in experimental psychology. And in the six volumes and the 2,133 pages
of the Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes (Estes, 1975-1978),
there is only one entry for affect and only one for attitude. It is
worth noting that both of these entries are in Volume 3 in a contribution
written by a social psychologist. In the last three volumes--those
principally devoted to cognition--there are no references to affect
whatsoever. (p. 152, Footnote 3)
This lack of attention to affective functioning is puzzling in view of
the fact that several prominent authors have emphasized the indispensable role
of affect and have studied it extensively (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Berlyne,
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1960, 1973; Festinger, 1957; Hebb, 1955; Olds, 1973; Schachter & Singer, 1962;
Wundt, 1907). What is even more puzzling is that authors, from time to time,
acknowledge the significance of affect but continue to devote little attention
to it. For instance, Ginsburg and Opper (1969) write:
Piaget recognizes that emotions influence thought, and . . . he
repeatedly states that no act of intelligence is complete without
emotions. . . . Nevertheless, Piaget's empirical investigations and
detailed theories substantially ignore the emotions in favor of the
structure of the intellect. (p. 5).
How can this paradox between what is preached and what is practiced be
explained? There is one explanation, which may very well be the only major
reason: Structural cognitive theories are not optimally equipped to deal with
affect. This supposition is consistent with the fact that structural theories
that study affect (e.g., Bower, 1981; de Rivera; 1977, Lehnert, Note 1) have
primarily ignored the traditional research on affective functioning. What
seems to be missing is a theoretical framework that is able to provide a basis
for identifying and integrating important affective variables and for
specifying the relation between affect and cognition in a parsimonious
fashion. In an attempt to solve this problem, we have developed a coherent
theory emphasizing the functional properties of the neuronal system. The
principle aspects of structural models and their constituent conceptual
metaphors have been discussed by Bransford, McCarrell, Franks, and Nitsch
(1977), Iran-Nejad (1980), Jenkins (1977), and Iran-Nejad and Ortony (Note 2).
Affect
4
Iran-Nejad and Ortony also discuss how a functional theory differs from a
structural approach. Other theories similar in spirit to the present
functional approach are those developed by John (1967, 1972) and by Katchalsky
and his associates (e.g., Katchalsky, Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974).
This paper will first present a brief discussion of what a structural
theory is like and will contrast it with a functional view. Then the
functional view will be discussed in more detail. Next, we will demonstrate
that traditional psychological research on affective variables, such as that
of Berlyne (1960), Festinger (1957), and Schachter (e.g., Schachter & Singer,
1962), is more consistent with a functional, as opposed to a structural,
theory of affect. Finally, we will discuss some of the empirical implications
of the functional view for the study of affective functioning. We will
discuss the functional view only insofar as it relates directly to the
phenomenon of affect. The reader interested in other aspects of the
functional theory, such as remembering, comprehension, and learning, is
referred to the sources cited above.
The Structural Aproach to Affect and Emotion
As an example of a structural theory, consider first de Rivera's (1977)
theory of emotion. While de Rivera describes his views in terms of Piaget's
Structuralism, his theory is also reminiscent of another slightly different
structural approach, namely, the semantic network theories of long-term
memory. In a network model, there is an abstract multidimensional space or
network encompassing the entire spectrum of psychological patterning.
According to de Rivera, affective structures (emotions) belong in such a
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psychological space. Each emotion is a schema in the Piagetian sense: a
self-regulated, holistic system of transformations. In such a network, "each
different emotion has a place in an overall structure of which it is a part"
(de Rivera, 1977, p. 36). The relative location of different emotions
determines the extent of their psychological closeness.
Transformations are movements along dimensions of psychological space.
Each type of emotion (e.g., anger, love) reflects different transformations.
These transformations are not changes along intrinsic organismic dimensions,
such as changes in the activity of the sympathetic nervous system (e.g.,
changes in heartrate); rather, they are internal representations (images) of
overt or covert changes involved in the way the organism, as a whole,
interacts with the environment (e.g., "digging a hole," "moving away from or
toward others," etc.). They are internalized Piagetian action sequences.
Finally, "the basic unit of emotional analysis is the dyad (the person and the
other) rather than the individual" (p. 37).
The emotion of anger, for instance, involves the transformation of the
"person" moving the "other" away from the "self." Fear differs from anger
since it involves "the person moving away from the other." Similarly, love is
"movement of person toward the other," and desire is the "person moving the
other toward him." These transformations are manifested in our bodily
movements. Love is a "giving" emotion (+ extension) and desire is a "getting"
emotion (+ contraction). Anger does not involve extension (- extension) and
fear does not manifest contraction (- contraction).
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Like de Rivera's theory, the majority of structural theories of affect
and emotion (e.g., Bower, 1981; Plutchik, 1962) are network models. Semantic
network models were originally postulated to represent the meaning of words in
the long-term memory (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969).
The most direct application of these models to the problem of affect was made
in a recent paper by Bower (1981), who extended the network model to explain
the state-dependent aspect of emotion. According to Bower, "each distinct
emotion such as joy, depression, or fear has a specific node or unit in memory
that collects together many other aspects of the emotion that are connected to
it by associative pointers" (p. 135). Other structuralists, while not denying
that structures have nodes or elements, emphasize that "the elements of a
structure are subordinated to [structural] laws . . . not reducible to
cumulative one-by-one association of its elements" (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 7).
In spite of their differences, all structural models seem to share at
least two global attributes. First, they are all intralevel theories (see
Wimsatt, 1976): They assume that the holistic structures and their
constituent elements are both mental in nature. Thus, they do not take into
account the functional properties of the biological hardware; mental
structures are characterized in terms of mental elements. Secondly, they
assume that psychological permanence is an inherent property of mental
structures and their organization. It is taken for granted that there exist
long-term mental structures and relations. By contrast, the functional view
is an interlevel approach. It assumes that at the mental level there are only
unanalyzable wholes and no elements. Elements, on the other hand, exist at
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the neuronal level; and it is the group functioning of these neuronal elements
that results in the creation of holistic mental structures. Furthermore, the
functional view assumes that mental structures are inherently transient; and
psychological permanence is a reflection of the consistent and stable
functional properties of neuronal elements.
Intralevel versus Interlevel Reductionism
While structural theories acknowledge that the mind is unanalyzable,
they, nonetheless, proceed to dichotomize and dissect it. It is often claimed
that mental structures possess characteristics that are unique to these
holistic patterns. Consequently, any elemental analysis of the structures
will destroy their properties. But since the notion of elements within a
structure is unavoidable, the schema is defined as a collection of mental
elements and mental relations (associations, rules--e.g., multiplication
rules, and so on). Since a structure is a whole with "over-all properties
distinct from the properties of its elements," one must adopt "from the start
a relational perspective, according to which it is relations among elements
that count" (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 79). Integers, for instance, have
structural properties "which are quite different from the properties of number
individuals" (Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 7); 35 is a nonprime number, while both 3
and 5, on the one hand, and 7 and 5, on the other, are prime.
What Piaget (1968/1970) argues against is intralevel reductionism, i.e.,
reductionism within the mental domain. "But there are at least two
functionally distinct kinds of reduction which are so different in their
functions . . . that one is led to doubt not only the unitary model of
Affect
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reduction but also the primacy of structure over function in its
characterization" (Wimsatt, 1976, pp. 214-215). Wimsatt argued that the
problems traditionally associated with reductionism are only applicable so
long as one takes an intralevel approach. The alternative to an intralevel
approach is an interlevel approach that attempts to specify the interface
between the mind and the functional properties of the nervous system.
Intralevel theorists often specify causal links directly between mental and
behavioral states. For instance, Lehnert's (Note 1) process model is
characterized in terms of affect maps that consist of affective units and
links between them. These links are assumed to signify causalities of affect
within and across characters. The interlevel approach, on the other hand,
assumes that causal interaction cannot be specified strictly within the mental
or behavioral domain without reference to the functional properties of the
biological hardware. Rather, mental structures exert their causal influence
on the functioning of neuronal elements, and the functioning of neuronal
constellations, in turn, results in the creation of mental structures (see
Dewan, 1976; Katchalsky, Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974; Maturana, 1978; Sperry,
1976; Wimsatt, 1976). According to Katchalsky and his associates, the mystery
in the old aphorism that "the qualitative whole is more than the quantitative
sum of its parts" is in the word more. It implies something for nothing.
However, if the "more" emerges as a consequence of the functioning of
biological mechanisms, it is no longer obtained for nothing. This is because
self-organizing dynamic properties of these mechanisms dissipate energy in
order to achieve this.
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Such arguments suggest that the solution to the parts-whole problem must
be sought in the specification of the functional properties of the components
of the biological system and in the way these components function to create
mental structures. Mental structures themselves, on the other hand, must be
studied only insofar as such investigation bears on the nature of the
functional properties of the nervous system.
Structural theories of affect and emotion often postulate a set of basic
emotions that mix to produce more complex emotions. Plutchik (1962) used the
analogy of the color-wheel to illustrate the mixing of emotions. He argued
that "it is necessary to conceive of the primary emotions as hues which may
vary in degree of intermixture (saturation) as well as intensity, and as
arrangeable around an emotion-circle similar to a color-wheel" (p. 109).
Berlyne (1971) has drawn attention to a potential difficulty in such a direct
analysis and synthesis of emotional structures:
Attempts to list basic emotions are like attempts to divide the visible
spectrum up into regions of similar color, with the possibility of adding
to the number of hues by color mixture. The principle difficulty, with
color as with emotion, is a lack of objective criteria, and thus of
agreement, on where the boundary lines should be drawn. It has, for
example, been established by the experiments of psycholinguists that the
familiar seven "colors of the rainbow" are peculiar to our culture;
members of other cultures divide up the spectrum quite differently.
(pp. 73-74)
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While there seem to be no universal criteria for dividing up the color-
wheel into primary colors, it has been shown that the universals of color
semantics can be explained in terms of the functional properties of the
neuronal elements underlying the perception of color. Kay and McDaniel (1978)
have reviewed the recent evidence on color-term semantics and argue that a
"widespread belief in linguistics and the philosophy of language, challenged
by the data reviewed here, is the doctrine that there exist ultimate semantic
primes which are discrete entities" (p. 611). As an alternative, Kay and his
associates present a neurophysiological model indicating that "all the basic
color categories of the languages of the world are based on the six
fundamental neural response categories, whose structures are determined by the
firing patterns of .o o cells in the visual pathway" (Kay, 1981, p. 64).
Similarly, the functional view assumes that affect and emotion can be more
readily explained in terms of the functional properties of the nervous system
and not in terms of some abstract emotion-circle or network.
Functional Permanence and Frame Permanence: An Example and an Analogy
The second general characteristic of structural approaches is that they
all place the locus of permanence at the mental level. They all assume that
permanence is a property of mental structures, that there exists a long-term
memory store or conceptual network, and that it is in terms of the structure
and the organization of such a storehouse or network that psychological
permanence must be specified. However, Bransford et al. (1977) and Jenkins
(1977) have seriously challenged the permanent storage metaphor. They have
argued that this is but one of the many possible alternatives.
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With respect to permanence, affect has been treated vastly differently by
different writers. For motivation theorists such as McClelland and his
associates (e.g., McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), it is a stable
and consistent instigator of action. For others, (see, e.g., Ryle, 1949), it
is little more than transitory "thrills," "pangs," and "glows" (e.g., a glow
of pleasure).
The functional approach assumes that permanence is a characteristic of
the biological hardware and is reflected in the consistent and stable
functional properties of the components of the nervous system. Mental
structures, on the other hand, are inherently transient.
The problem of permanence is a particular case of the more general
problem of the preservation of form that goes beyond psychological phenomena.
Consider an analogy from Miller's The Body in Question (1978):
The survival of form depends on one of two principles: the intrinsic
stability of the materials from which the object is made, or the
energetic replenishment and reorganization of the material which is
constantly flowing through it. The substances from which a marble statue
is made are stably bonded together, so that the object retains not only
its shape but its original material. The configuration of a fountain, on
the other hand, is intrinsically unstable, and it can retain its shape
only by endlessly renewing the material which constitutes it; that is, by
organizing and imposing structure on the unremitting flow of its own
substance. Statues preserve their shap; fountains perform and
re-perform theirs. (p. 140; italics added)
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Thus, there are two types of structures: stable and unstable. And there
are two types of permanence. Structural permanence is inherent in the
structure itself. Functional permanence is inherent in the functional
properties of the underlying system(s) that create and recreate the
structures. These systems and their properties are permanent, to be sure, but
are not the same sort of stuff as the structures they create. The engines,
the pipes, the pressure, and the water are not isomorphic with the fountain
they jointly create. Note that by specifying the components of the underlying
system and how they relate, one can understand the way the fountain is
created; but the latter (i.e., the created fountain) is not reduced to the
former. This is the essence of an interlevel approach.
Structural psychological theories assume that permanence is an inherent
property of mental structures. The functional view maintains that mental
structures are inherently transient. They are created postfunctionally (see
Iran-Nejad & Ortony, Note 2). They are formed as a consequence of neuronal
functioning. And they last as long as this functioning is rehearsed by
hundreds of autonomous neuronal elements each of which can, in principle,
participate in the creation of an indefinite number of structures.
In accounting for the permanence of mental structures, therefore, it
seems that a choice would have to be made between two different levels of
analysis. One can assume the locus of permanence to be in the structure and
attempt to specify long-term mental relations. Alternatively, one can assume
that permanence is inherent in the functioning of autonomous neuronal elements
and try to specify functional properties that would make it possible for these
Affect
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elements to permanently and consistently create and recreate transient
functional structures. Since in affect and in cognition, as in the case of
fountains, we have to deal with unstable and constantly varying structures,
the functional view deserves serious consideration. It urges a shift in the
locus of analysis in psychology, from a direct description of created
structures to a description of the functional characteristics of the
underlying systems. However, this does not mean mental relations must not be
investigated. Rather, it means (a) that a formal theory of mental structures
based on precise algorithmic analyses need not, and possibly cannot, be
constructed, and (b) that investigation of mental structures must not serve
toward an end goal of constructing a formal description of these structures;
it must be done in subordination to the goal of specifying the functional
properties of neuronal elements. Mental structures are analyzed only insofar
as such analysis directly helps us understand "the style of the brain" (Arbib,
1981).
Structural theories are best suited to deal with permanent structures.
This is probably why philosophical structuralism leads to such questions as
whether or not the structure of a statue exists in the block of stone before
it is carved, why psychological structuralism hypothesizes permanent mental
structures in the head, or why many structuralists tend to hypothesize innate
structures (e.g., Chomsky, 1980). According to the functional approach,
permanent mental structures cannot exist; the latter must be created and
recreated.
Affect
14
What then must a functional psychological (as opposed to an artificial
intelligence) theory of affect do? Clearly, it must not build a long-term
storage or a permanent structural network. Nor must it, as an end goal,
construct a formal, algorithmic, representational system of such a repository
or network that would be programmable into a computer. Instead, it must (a)
specify how global affective states dynamically relate to localized components
(e.g., distributed neuronal elements) of the nervous system; it must (b)
provide a plausible account of affective valence and awareness; it must (c)
present a plausible account of the concept of self; and, finally, it must (d)
allow plausible definitions for affective variables (e.g.,
pleasantness/unpleasantness and interestingness). We hope this approach may
place us in a better position to design experiments leading toward an
integrated body of data on affective and mental functioning. Current research
on affective functioning is carried out under a great number of "spot"
theories. As Athey (1976) notes from the perspective of reading education,
"the literature on affective factors misses the connecting thread of a good
theory to make sense of the plethora of inconclusive and contradictory data"
(p. 739).
Functional Properties and the Creation of Affect
Elements of a functional theory of cognition are evident in the work of
Bartlett (1932), Bransford and his colleagues (e.g., Bransford, McCarrell,
Franks, & Nitsch, 1977), Jenkins (1977), and Minsky (1980). These authors
have also given special attention to the role affect plays in remembering.
Bartlett draws attention to "the fact . . . that when a subject is being asked
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to remember, very often the first thing that emerges is something of the
nature of an attitude" (p. 207). Similarly, Minsky maintains that "attitudes
do really precede propositions" rather than the other way around:
In this modern era of "information processing psychology" it may seem
quaint to talk of mental states; it is more fashionable to speak of
representations, frames, scripts, or semantic networks. But while we
find it lucid enough to speak in such terms about memories of things,
sentences, or even faces, it is much harder so to deal with feelings,
insights, and understandings--and all the attitudes, dispositions, and
ways of seeing things that go with them. . .. We usually put such
issues aside, saying that one must first understand simpler things. But
what if feelings and viewpoints are the simpler things? (p. 118)
In order to explain mental states, Minsky (1980) conceived of "the mind
(or the brain) as [being] composed of many partially autonomous "agents.l"
He proposed that "no single one of these little agents need know much by
itself, but each recognizes certain configurations of a few associates and
responds by altering its state" (p. 119). In this section, we will try to
demonstrate how a similar assumption makes it possible to present plausible
accounts of such basic aspects of affective functioning as awareness and
valence, as well as the notion of self.
Affect
16
Awareness
As Mandler (1975) has noted, "consciousness (awareness or private
experience) . . . has generated some of the most extreme positions in
psychological theory, varying from its denial by some behaviorists to an
assertion of its exclusive dominance by some phenomenologists" (p. 12). While
emphasizing the role of awareness as an important parameter in emotional
functioning, Mandler also points out:
Translating the private datum of consciousness into useful theoretical
constructs remains one of the interesting tasks facing theoretical
psychology. . . . We still tend to use ancient and philosophical
interpretations of consciousness. The theoretical-analytic enterprise
that properly dissects the ordinary language meaning of consciousness and
constructs theoretically meaningful terms and processes (and not just a
single state or mechanism) is still to be undertaken. (p. 12)
The influence of the single-unit philosophical view of consciousness on
neurophysiological research has been discussed by Luria (1978). The primary
purpose of this research has been to identify a unitary neuronal structure
whose stimulation would give the individual conscious experience and whose
destruction would render the person unconscious. As an alternative, Luria
proposes what he calls a semantic and system-based explanation of awareness,
one that goes beyond the notion of consciousness as a changing state of
wakefulness that results from the activity of the reticular formation. Luria
emphasizes the contribution of other brain regions such as posterior and
frontal cortical areas. He writes:
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Attempts to seek the material substrate of consciousness at the single-
unit or synaptic level . . . thus begin to be seen as completely
hopeless. The cerebral basis of man's complex, semantic, system-based
conscious activity must be sought in the combined activity of discrete
brain systems, each of which makes its own special contribution to the
work of the functional system as a whole. (p. 31)
Mandler's and Luria's quotations seem to call for a distributed account
of awareness. Similar suggestions have been made by Sperry (e.g., 1969, 1976)
and by Restak (1979, 1981). According to Sperry (1969), "conscious properties
. . . are directly dependent on the action of the component neuronal elements"
(p. 534); and as Restak (1981) put it, it is possible "that the interaction
between millions of neurons within the brain induces complex electric fields
that are ultimately responsible for consciousness" (p. 19). However, the
details of a distributed account of awareness have not yet been spelled out.
This section attempts to present such an account.
The locus of the generation and perception of awareness. The central
assumption of the present functional view is that there exist physically
unitary and functionally autonomous neuronal elements that can function, in
principle, independently of other neuronal elements and, therefore, can
participate in an indefinite number of functional combinations. "One possible
outcome of considering discrete systems embedded in a continuous system would
be the subordination of obvious structural discreteness to a functional one:
the spatially discrete elements could be brought to functional continuity
. . . or the structurally continuous medium to functional (dynamic)
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discontinuity" (Rowland, reported in Katchalsky, Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974,
p. 78). The predominant principle that determines functional properties of
neuronal elements is assumed to be specialization or spec ificity of function.
This means that each neuronal element is specialized, or is capable of getting
specialized, to function in a unique fashion and, thereby, to manifest some
specific functional properties. One such property is the generation, by the
element as a neuroanatomic system, of a unique feeling of awareness, a means
of "communicating" to the global system that "I, the functioning element, am"
in a state of functioning (activation or inhibition), either singly (explicit
awareness) or in combination with other elements (implicit awareness).
Conceptualized in this fashion, awareness can equip the overall system not
only with a means of directly "monitoring" the activity of its components but
also with a basis for distinguishing between them. This is, however, to speak
metaphorically. In functional terms, the active element is assumed to be at
the same time the creator and the perceiver of awareness. Awareness mediates
the element-system relationship by means of two complementary mechanisms of
simultaneous and independent functioning, which will be discussed later.
Functional constellations and nonspecific awareness. Functional
properties of individual neuronal elements are specific properties; they can,
in principle, be traced to a specific physical system, the element itself.
However, it must be emphasized that neuronal elements do not represent
particular emotions or ideas. The latter are created when a great number of
elements function simultaneously. Such functional combinations have
nonspecific properties, properties that cannot be traced to any one specific
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physical system. Mental states and patterns, therefore, are nonspecific and
unanalyzable in this particular sense, as are, by analogy, the physical
(structural) properties of water. It is not clear what oxygen or hydrogen
contributes to the physical properties of water; it is only possible to see
that such properties emerge when the two gases combine. The functioning of
the neuronal system and the generation and the experience of awareness can be
conceptualized more readily by analogy to a light constellation. Imagine a
constellation of lightbulbs in which each individual lightbulb is painted a
unique color and, consequently, produces a unique pattern of light. In such a
constellation, when a subset of lightbulbs is on, it creates a unique
nonspecific light pattern. The pattern is nonspecific because its global
properties (i.e., the overall color of the generated light pattern) are
created by group functioning of several lightbulbs and can be traced only to
the functioning constellation as a whole and not to any discrete (specific)
element (i.e., to any one lightbulb).
An important consequence of this view of awareness is that changes in
awareness occur as a function of changes in the functioning of underlying
neuronal elements. At one extreme, abrupt changes mean sharp awareness of the
changing elements. At the other extreme, no change in functioning generates
no awareness. By analogy, changes in the overall light pattern generated by a
set of colored lightbulbs can come about when new lights go on, old lights go
off, and/or when some lights go brighter or dimmer, not by changing the
resultant light pattern itself into a new form.
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If the present view is correct, it means that, within certain specifiable
constraints, the constellation of neur nal elements that are active at a given
moment will combine to create a unitary functional pattern, and, consequently,
a unitary feeling of awareness. Evidence for such combinatorial nature of
awareness comes from the split-brain research carried out by Sperry (e.g.,
1968) and others. This evidence suggests that "in the normal brain, the right
and left hemispheric components combine and function as a unit in the causal
sequence of cerebral control. In the divided brain, on the other hand, each
hemispheric component gets its own separate causal effect as a distinct
entity" (Sperry, 1976, p. 174); in the latter case, each separate hemisphere
forms its own unitary functional combination; each hemisphere creates "a mind
of its own."
Finally, the interface between the functionally autonomous neuronal
elements and the nonspecific, postfunctional psychological patterns may be
conceptualized by analogy with the concepts of genotype and phenotype as used
in genetics. At the "genotypic" neuronal level, there are specialized
neuronal elements that can, like genes, participate in an indefinite number of
combinations. The psychological level itself, however, corresponds to the
phenotypic level. In the same fashion that a particular combination of genes
acts as a basis for the creation of a particular organism with particular
phenotypic characteristics, a particular combination of neuronal elements acts
to create a particular psychological structure. The analogy, however, breaks
down as far as the relative permanence of phenotypic organismic structures, as
opposed to the transience of psychological structures, is concerned. Grown
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organisms cannot be "undone" into their elementary genes, so the latter could
each participate in some other organism. Psychological structures can,
presumably, "uncombine," at the genotypic level, into their component neuronal
elements.
The Combinatorial Aspects of Mental Functioning
What holds the system together? A system comprising functionally
autonomous elements that interact via the establishment of transient
postfunctional relations constitutes a fully dynamic system. In order to run,
such a system would have to somehow resolve two problems, both having to do
with how the complex system holds together as a unitary coherent entity.
First, the component elements would have to have some way of establishing
dynamic relations with the overall system and vice versa. Following Bartlett
(1932), we believe that the mechanism responsible for such interaction is
awareness; the active component element is the creator and the perceiver of a
unique feeling of awareness, thereby catching, via its very functioning, the
"attention" of the overall system by becoming itself the focal center of
awareness in it. As Bartlett states, awareness gives the system a way of
"turning round upon itself."
Secondly, the component elements would have to have some way of
establishing dynamic relations among themselves. What sort of mechanism would
render this interaction possible? The functional view assumes that the causal
locus of element-element interaction must also be sought in the functioning of
the specialized autonomous element itself. For instance, a functioning
element can generate a unique pattern of physical energy whose presence in the
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system can, in turn, serve as a sufficient condition for another specialized
element, or a constellation, to get activated.
Three types of functional relations may be hypothesized: consonance,
dissonance, and irrelevance (Festinger, 1957). Two (or more) neuronal
elements are consonant if they are specialized such that functioning of one
element leads to initiation of functioning in the other.
happen would be if the functioning of the first element
generation of a unique pattern of energy which would,
(sufficient) condition for the second element to begin
functional relation between two elements is irrelevance if
has no effect on the functioning of the other.
Functional dissonance arises when consonantly related
function in a direction opposite to the one required
functioning. Suppose the consonant relation between A and
One way this could
resulted in the
in turn, serve as
functioning. The
functioning of one
elements tend to
by their consonant
B is activation-
activation and between C and B is activation-inhibition. Dissonance will
arise if A and C tend to function simultaneously; since this will cause B to
fluctuate in two opposite functional directions, namely, activation (due to
stimulation from A) and inhibition (due to stimulation from C).
The simple system of postfunctional relations hypothesized here can
provide a basis for explaining the creation and recreation of affective and
cognitive patterns. Together with awareness, it also makes it possible to see
how component-component and system-component interaction may take place.
The transient aspect of mental combinations. In a fountain, there is
only one actual configuration, namely, the configuration of the (present)
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moment. Past configurations no longer exist; nor are they relevant. By
analogy, the only actual psychological pattern is the schema-of-the-moment,
the totality of the functioning neuronal elements distributed in various
regions of the nervous system. An emotion is a schema-of-the-moment in which
the affective component is predominant.
Thus, emotions, as well as other mental structures, are transient
phenomena and last only as long as the underlying neuronal elements maintain
functioning, in the same fashion that the fountain lasts only as long as the
underlying system runs. There is no need for storage of any mental frames or
any other mental entity. (For a discussion of the problem of remembering, see
Iran-Nejad & Ortony, Note 2.) Furthermore, beyond the functional constraints
imposed by specialization of autonomous neuronal elements (e.g., consonant and
irrelevant relations) there is no need for any underlying structural
blueprints. As Arbib (1981) put it, "we can no longer think of a single
localized schema for each familiar object in our environment, but we must
rather imagine that the appropriate pattern of activity can be reproduced"
(p. 33). This is especially true if we think of a concept as a transient
pattern created by the activity of autonomous neuronal elements distributed
across various regions (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.) of the
nervous system.
While mental structures are transient, duration of functioning in
autonomous neuronal elements can vary. Some elements are always active or
follow a regular functional rhythm (cycle). Elements involved in the concepts
of self, of time, and of space are examples. Functioning of other elements is
more transitory.
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Initiation of functioning in neuronal elements takes place either
endogenously or exogenously. One obvious example of endogenous initiation is
the activity of those neuronal elements that are involved in the awakening of
the organism from sleep. Another example is the activation of neuronal
elements as a function of their logical or pragmatic consonance with other
active elements in the schema-of-the-moment. Exogenous initiation occurs
independently of the schema-of-the-moment; for instance, when neuronal
elements get activated under the influence of external energy patterns (e.g.,
textual stimuli).
Resolution and Dissolution Aspects of the Schema-of-the-Moment
If neuronal elements generate energy patterns that provide sufficient
conditions for other elements to get activated, how is it that upon the
activation of the first element, all other elements subsequently related to it
do not get activated in some sort of a chain reaction? The first reason for
this is that particular elements (or constellations) often function in
combination and, when they do, their characteristic energy pattern combines
with that of other elements to form interference patterns (see Iran-Nejad &
Ortony, Note 2, for a discussion). These interference patterns are different
from specific energy patterns generated by individual components and,
consequently, cannot serve as sufficient conditions for the activation of
elements that they would otherwise activate. In other words, the generation
of a characteristic energy pattern can activate other elements only if the
element (or the constellation) functions independently of other elements. The
second reason that a reaction chain does not occur is that internal energy
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patterns are not the only source of initiation. Often, elements that must
enter the chain of activation, so to speak, have to depend on external energy
patterns. For these and perhaps other reasons the development of the schema-
of-the-moment is always constrained by the extent to which the problem of
initiation of functioning in neuronal elements is gradually resolved.
Consequently, the term resolution can more aptly describe the dynamic
development of the schema-of-the-moment than combination.
A particular schema-of-the-moment can be either resolved, resolving, or
unresolved. A resolved schema-of-the-moment is one in which all the elements
function in a harmonious (consonant) fashion and, consequently, the global and
local functioning go hand in hand. Completeness (closure) is another aspect
of a resolved schema-of-the-moment. A resolving schema-of-the-moment is one
in which all the local elements cannot yet function in a harmonious global
fashion--because in order to do so, functioning of other as yet inactive
elements is necessary. However, since consonant elements are constantly being
introduced, the dynamic mechanism that moves the schema toward resolution is
kept alive. An unresolved schema-of-the-moment is a (temporarily) "stalling"
schema which cannot move in the direction of resolution because new consonant
elements fail to get activated.
Not all schemata-of-the-moment can be characterized by resolution. The
latter is a combinatorial mechanism. Any system comprising autonomous
elements, must have some way of unbinding the already combined elements in
order for the latter to be used in new combinations. This is accomplished by
what might be called schema dissolution. Therefore, in principle, a schema-
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of-the-moment can also be dissolved, dissolving, or undissolved. A dissolved
schema-of-the-moment is one that can maintain a coherent organization only to
the extent that many elements dissonant with it can be inhibited. The global
experience of the moment may be labeled as "unconvincing." A dissolving
schema-of-the-moment is one that is in a state of crisis because, while the
schema is not yet totally disrupted, dissonant elements are being introduced.
An undissolved schema-of-the-moment is a "stalling" schema which cannot move
in the direction of dissolution because further dissonant elements fail to get
introduced into it.
Nonspecific Properties of the Schema-of-the-Moment
If one considers the configuration of a fountain at a particular point in
time, a set of unique global properties can be identified--the particular
shape, the silverish beads or spray, the diffused movements, the sound, and so
on. These are nonspecific properties because, while the fountain consists of
a great number of specific springs, the properties of the whole fountain
cannot be traced to any discrete underlying component; they are the creation
of the act of combination. Analogously, every schema-of-the-moment has its
unique global properties. If the functional theory is correct, the relevant
variables influencing the global properties of the schema-of-the-moment are
such factors as awareness valence (positive, negative, or neutral),
resolution/dissolution (resolved, resolving, unresolved, dissolved,
dissolving, or undissolved), independent/simultaneous functioning (local or
global focus), and change (gradual or abrupt). A resolved schema-of-the-
moment can give rise to such feelings as coherence, completeness,
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meaningfulness, contentment, and so on. A resolving schema-of-the-moment may
generate suspense, uncertainty, expectation, interestingness, and anxiety.
Similar feelings of awareness may be associated with unresolved (e.g.,
incompleteness, discontent), dissolved (e.g., incoherence, senselessness,
anomaly), dissolving (e.g., confusion, puzzlement), and undissolved (e.g.,
stress, restlessness). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in any
detail internal state concepts in the context of the functional approach.
Therefore, we close this section with the hypothesis that factors governing
the meaning, categorization, and use of internal state words (see, e.g., Hall
& Nagy, 1979) may vary along the functional dimensions suggested here.
Consider, for instance, meaning. Earlier, it was claimed that awareness is an
indispensable aspect of affective functioning. If this is true, it must
somehow be reflected in the meaning of internal state words. The
unacceptability of (la)-(lc) supports this claim:
(la) I am angry but I am not aware of it.
(ib) Father Brown believes that God created the world in seven days but
he is not aware of it.
(ic) I remember the name of my cousin but I am not aware of it.
In fact, if the functional theory is correct, there is nothing else to
the meaning of internal state words than the transient state they refer to.
This counterintuitive claim is in direct opposition to the notion that there
exists a permanent representation for the meaning of every word in some
alleged semantic network. The fact that (2b) is more acceptable than (2a)
suggests that our intuitions contradict the pre-existence of such
representations:
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(2a) I know the meaning of the word structuralism but I have forgotten
it.
(2b) I have Piaget's book called Structuralism but I have forgotten
where I have put ito
If forgetting meant that "I have the meaning represented in my head but I
fail to find and to access it," as some structuralists would put it, then (2a)
would have to be as acceptable as (2b). Given the functional view, the term
know can only be meaningfully applied to the transient phenotypic
psychological level. It is often suggested that people might know something
without being aware of it. The unacceptability of (2a) indicates that our
intuitions contradict this. What we are not aware of is not (yet) what we
know; and what we remember is not what we retrieve but what we conceive
(create).
Mental Functioning and the Self
Traditional research bearing on the phenomenon of affect, especially the
research motivated by consistency theories (see, e.g., Abelson, Aronson,
McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, & Tannenbaum, 1968), suggests a close
interrelationship among the self, dissonance, and affective valence. The
nature of this interaction, however, is currently unclear. Perhaps the major
reason for this is that we know nothing about the self beyond the
phenomenological, ordinary language notion of self, a unitary homuncular
entity capable of performing essentially everything the individual as a whole
can do. For instance, Puccetti (1981) speculated, on the basis of evidence
from split-brain patients, that there are two "selves," one in each
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hemisphere. In her commentary on Puccetti's article, Churchland (1981) argued
that the controversy over the number of selves and their location is like the
dispute over how many angels can dance on the head of the proverbial pin. The
self, like angels and demons, "is so ill-defined that we do not know how to
begin to count or what to take as a reasonable estimate. In the absence of
theory to provide principles for individuating, one man's considered judgment
is another man's jest" (p. 103).
While the phenomenological ordinary language can easily lead to the
notion of self in terms of countable homunculi, the functional view provides
the concepts and the language for a plausible distributed account of the
nature of self and its interaction with other aspects of affective
functioning. It makes it possible to see how the phenotypic psychological
level and the genotypic neuronal level might interact to create a unitary
experience of self-awareness.
At the phenotypic psychological level, the totality of the functioning
elements of the moment combine to constitute the unitary experience of the
moment. We will refer to this unitary experience as the inherent self. That
this global experience does constitute an (inherent) self has been suggested
by Zajonc (1980). Zajonc cited evidence suggesting that "the self involved
. . . is probably some global and general impression suffused with affective
quality" (p. 167). In contrast with the inherent self, there is what might be
called the acquired concept of self. This aspect of the notion of self
involves the particular ideas about the self and is based, at the genotypic
level, on active neuronal elements that, by themselves or in combination with
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other active elements of the moment, create our self-image, self-esteem,
personal history, immediate or long-term concerns or goals, and so on. Under
normal circumstances, the inherent self--the schema-of-the-moment--always
includes an implicit concept of self. However, given the functional
perspective, it must be possible for the inherent self to exist without an
active concept of self. And indeed, this seems to be the case. It can
happen, for instance, when, as a result of some dramatic life-threatening
incident, a person forgets everything up to the moment of the incident. The
permanently active elements creating the acquired concept of self somehow
undergo inhibition. The inherent self, however, does not go away. Even
though, the schema-of-the-moment may persist in a resolving state until
everything is back to normal, the overall sense of unity is presumably never
lost.
At the genotypic neuronal level, there are only functionally autonomous
specialized neuronal elements, each of which generates a unique feeling of
awareness. At this level, the categories into which the neuronal elements
fall may have a bearing on the notion of self. For instance, it can be
assumed (a) that all the specialized neuronal elements fall into three broad
categories with respect to the valence of the awareness they
generate--positive, negative, and neutral--and (b) that positive and negative
elements somehow (e.g., via gross phylogenetic specialization) constitute two
mutually inconsistent sets (or neural networks).
How do the phenotypic psychological aspects of self (i.e., the inherent
self and the acquired concept of self) relate to the genotypic neuronal level
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(i.e., to the three categories of positive, negative, and neutral neuronal
elements)? It may be plausibly assumed that only the negative elements are,
via gross phylogentic specialization, "self"-dissonant. It would follow that
both positive and neutral elements are self-consonant. Note that, given the
notion of the inherent self, there can be no self-irrelevant elements. The
acquired concept of self determines the long-term valence of the self and the
inherent self is responsible for the transient valence of it. Thus, a person
having a concept of self involving many negative elements (a low self-esteem
individual?) would be ordinarily in a negative mood, even though, the inherent
aspect of self may bring transient euphoric spells to the extent that positive
elements are momentarily introduced and to the extent that the negative
elements ordinarily involved in the concept of self get inhibited. Similarly,
a predominantly positive concept of self (a high self-esteem individual?) may
be caught in an aversive situation, if the inherent self is predominantly
negative.
Thus, according to the functional view, there can be no homuncular self
to reside in some location in the head. Self-awareness is a distributed
phenomenon inherent in the very functioning of whatever specialized neuronal
elements happen to be active. Thus, as long as the overall neural network
remains functionally intact and some neuronal elements are functioning, they
combine to create the inherent self. To the extent a particular portion of
the network is disconnected (e.g., one hemisphere), integration between that
portion and the disjoined portions (e.g., the other hemisphere) will be
hampered. Thus, the distributed view of self-awareness is consistent with
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inter- and intrahemispheric unity. For instance, in a split-brain patient,
one hemisphere may not know what the other hemisphere just did if it is
separated from it. And since each hemisphere is in contact with an otherwise
intact neural system, whatever neural elements are active in it will join to
constitute a unitary self.
The distributed view of self also means that as long as some neuronal
elements are active, the unity and the identity of the inherent self is
preserved. Even in the most fragmentary dreams, we seem to somehow maintain
the identity of a unitary self and the feeling that it is "me" and no one
else.
Attentional Consequences of Neuronal Functioning
Global functioning, in which a constellation of elements function in a
simultaneous and harmonious fashion, has the advantage of allowing the
totality of the psychological experience of the moment to constitute a unitary
feeling of self-awareness characteristic of a single individual organism or
self. However, if organismic systems were only capable of global functioning,
they would have (a) no way of becoming explicitly aware of the functioning of
their constituents, and (b) they would have no control over them. Therefore,
as Bartlett (1932) has noted, there must be some way for the individual
component (consisting of one or more neuronal elements) to function
independently in the context of the overall schema-of-the-moment. By
independent functioning we mean that there should occur a change in the
functioning of a particular component, compared to the global level of
functioning of the schema-of-the-moment. When such independent functioning
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occurs, the particular component becomes the center (focus) of awareness (or
attention) of the organism. Focusing or attention may be either local, if an
element or a local constellation manages to function independently, or global,
when the element or constellation functions in unison with the global schema-
of-the-moment. Local focus leads to explicit awareness of the particular
component, and global focus to implicit awareness of it. According to this
view, independent functioning is simultaneously a mechanism responsible for
attention (broad or focused) and for awareness (implicit or explicit). If a
constellation of neurons do not change their (rate of) functioning, we will
not be aware of them. If they change their functioning simultaneously with
other groups of neurons, we will be implicitly aware of them. If they change
their functioning as a single group by themselves, we become explicitly aware
of them as a single unit.
The scope of independent functioning varies and may be constrained by the
physical organization of the neuronal system. Consider a neuronal
organization which is highly consistent with the known organization of the
brain: Assume that the totality of neuronal elements divide into several
grossly specialized (gross specialization being determined phylogenetically)
local neuroanatomic regions--the visual cortex, the auditory cortex, the motor
cortex, the pleasure/unpleasure areas and so on. Let us assume that further
specialization of the neuronal elements within each of these areas occurs
ontogenetically such that, at a given point in the life of the organism, each
region contains its own repertoire or pool of specialized neurons. At the
most global level, some elements within each and every area would be active,
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and all the active consonant elements distributed in all the areas would
function harmoniously. This would create the most nonspecific experience of
the moment--the global inherent self. At the next level, while neuronal
elements in other areas are also in a state of functioning, some group of
elements in one area (e.g., the visual cortex) manages to function
independently, by changing its rate of functioning under exogenous or
endogenous stimulation. The particular area becomes the focus of attention at
that moment. Yet at another level of focusing, particular local elements in a
given area can function independently of other elements in the same region
2
and/or of elements in other areas.
If this way of characterizing attention is correct, there must be two
distinguishable aspects to attention on a given component. There must be an
attention phase of short duration. This we will call the attention-catching
aspect, and we believe it is determined by independent functioning. There
must also be an attention phase of variable, and often longer, duration. This
can be called the attention-holding aspect and must be determined by
simultaneous functioning. This account of attention is consistent with the
known neurophysiological and psychological data on attention. Pribram and
McGinness (1975), who reviewed this data, concluded:
Three neurally distinct and separate attentional systems--arousal [the
short phase], activation [the long phase], and effort--operate upon the
information processing mechanism. The presumed operation of these
control systems is perhaps best illustrated as follows: The orienting
reaction involves arousal but no activation; vigilant readiness involves
Affect
35
activation but no arousal; the defense reaction involves arousal and
activation; when neither arousal nor activation is present, behavior is
automatic, that is, stimulus-response contingencies are direct without
the intervention of any of the control mechanisms of attention. (p. 133)
An obvious difference between our account and that of Pribram and
McGinness is that the present functional view does not allow neurally distinct
mechanisms. On the contrary, the functional view implies that attention must
be a distributed phenomenon; any neuronal constellation can become the focus
of attention provided that it functions independently.
How about the "effort" aspect of attention? While independent
functioning under the influence of external stimulation may take place in a
more or less effortless fashion, endogenous independent functioning--that
caused by internal sources of initiation--often involves the psychological
experience of "effort." What functional conditions give rise to this
experience? We believe it results when an inactive element or constellation
must get activated under the influence of other already-active elements. In
other words, active components of the schema-of-the-moment must be utilized as
a source of initiation of functioning in inactive elements. This is possible
because if a component of the schema-of-the-moment functions independently, it
generates a characteristic energy pattern that, as we mentioned earlier, can
serve as a sufficient condition for activating other elements; as might
happen, for instance, when the schema-of-the-moment already contains an idea
and we want to verbalize it. At times, this type of functional initiation may
involve trial and error, and, as Bartlett (1932) has noted, it may be only
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possible through the mediation of awareness. It happens when the global
structure manages to influence the functioning of local neuronal elements;
when the overall system somehow manages to "turn round upon itself."
If the present account of attention is correct, the interface between the
phenotypic psychological level and the genotypic neuronal level must form a
causal loop. First in this loop comes initiation of functioning in particular
neuronal elements. This can happen in different areas of the nervous system,
under the influence of different internal or external sources of stimulation,
and at different times--elements creating an idea need not initiate
functioning at the same time. Next comes the combination of these elements,
within themselves and with those that are already active, and the creation of
particular ideas at the phenotypic level. When this happens, recognition and
explicit awareness of the just-created idea occurs. The idea is conceived, so
to speak. After this attention-catching phase, i.e., once an idea is created,
it can become implicit in the schema-of-the-moment--the attention-holding
aspect. This occurs through simultaneous or "choral" functioning of the
genotypic neuronal elements, when elements come to function harmoniously with
those participating in the schema-of-the-moment. Once an idea is implicit in
the schema-of-the-moment, explicit awareness (discrimination) of it can occur
only if the underlying neuronal element can somehow manage, endogenously or
exogenously, to function independently (i.e., change its rate of functioning
to a level different from that of the schema-of-the-moment). Finally,
independent functioning at the genotypic neuronal level generates a unique
pattern of energy that can serve as a sufficient condition to initiate
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functioning in other neuronal elements, and the causal loop continues during
all waking hours.
Thus, the functional view provides the concepts for specifying the
interface between the phenotypic psychological level and genotypic neuronal
functioning. It also makes it possible to specify the functional
interrelationship among different regions (i.e., visual, auditory, motor,
etc.) of the nervous system. For instance, at a broad level, the functional
view is consistent with the notions of partial independence of affective
functioning (Zajonc, 1980). Physiological evidence, such as gathered by Olds
and his associates (see, e.g., Olds, 1973), suggests that there are areas of
the brain, sometimes called the pleasure/unpleasure regions (Weil, 1974), that
may contain the genotypic neuronal elements underlying what Zajonc (1980)
calls the preferenda. At the genotypic level, it is conceivable, therefore,
that initiation of functioning in the pleasure/unpleasure region can occur
before, after, or even without such cognitive acts as recognition,
discrimination, or awareness of an idea at the phenotypic level. This is
because ideas are created and are, consequently, felt, recognized, or
discriminated only when constellations of elements required to create them are
fully, but not partially, in a state of functioning. The elements responsible
for the liking of an idea may be active long before the constellation
responsible for its creation as a whole becomes functional and the idea is
created.
The creation of the explicit awareness, as a discriminatory mechanism,
resulting from independent functioning deserves to be mentioned again in
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closing this section. It is perhaps in reference to such coincidence of
functional change and awareness that William James considered physiological
changes (such as in heartrate or muscular activity) to be the same as
emotions. It is only when our heartrate reaches above its normal rate that we
become aware of it, or it catches our attention. And everyone has had the
experience of "hearing" the clock only after it stops ticking.
The Functional Approach and Traditional Theories of Affect
Unlike current cognitive psychologists, several earlier authors
concentrated on the study of affect. The present section will summarize this
research and will argue that it is more consistent with a functional theory of
affect.
Consistency Theories
Several psychologists have assumed that cognitive functioning tends
toward consonance or consistency (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Osgood &
Tannenbaum, 1955). Dissonance or inconsistency, on the other hand, gives rise
to negative affect and, consequently, people try to avoid or resolve it.
By far the most influential consistency theory has been dissonance
theory, developed by Festinger and his associates (Aronson, 1968; Aronson,
Carlsmith, & Darley, 1963; Carlsmith & Aronson, 1963). Aronson pointed out in
1968 that the major strength of Festinger's theory is that it constantly
generates research (see also Zajonc, 1968, p. 359). Today it continues to do
so (see, e.g., Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zanna, 1979).
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In its original and still standard formulation, dissonance theory is
primarily concerned with the dissonance between one's private beliefs and
actions. Imagine subjects writing an essay in favor of a topic to which they
are strongly opposed (e.g., the military draft). If they do so under
conditions of internal justification (e.g., free choice, or insufficient
reward), they will change their attitude in a more favorable direction. If,
on the other hand, they do this under external justification (e.g., forced
compliance, or sufficient reward), no such change would occur. According to
Festinger, freely choosing to write a counter-attitudinal essay creates
cognitive dissonance between the cognitions involved in:
1. I am opposed to the military draft, and
2. I am engaged in writing (suggesting to readers that I am) in favor of
it.
As the number of elements consonant with #1 increases, the magnitude of
dissonance will increase. Subjects may think that they are rightly opposed to
the draft because American youths should not be forced to fight other people's
wars in faraway lands. Similarly, if the number of elements dissonant with #2
increases, the magnitude of dissonance will also increase. The subject may
think that he is being dishonest by arguing publicly in favor of what he is
privately opposed to. Conversely, if the number of elements dissonant with #1
or consonant with #2 increases, the magnitude of dissonance will decrease. In
the first case, subjects may think that the quality of American servicemen
under the all-volunteer army has deteriorated and has placed the United States
in a dangerously vulnerable position militarily. In the second case, they may
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think they are merely participating in an experiment and by writing the essay
they are doing the experimenter a favor.
Increases in the magnitude of dissonance will result in cognitive effort
on the part of the subject to reduce the dissonance. One way to do this is to
change one's attitude towards a more favorable one. However, if there is
external justification, then the latter in itself provides elements consonant
with #2 and, to that extent, there will be no dissonance and, therefore, no
attitude change.
Dissonance theorists have attacked several basic problems concerning
affective functioning and its relation to cognition. The hypotheses most
central to dissonance theory are that dissonance is an unpleasant state and
that it is this unpleasantness that motivates (causes) its resolution.
Several authors have also presented evidence bearing on such problems as
whether dissonance situations are arousing (Kiesler & Pallak, 1976) or whether
it is the arousal or the unpleasantness of dissonance situations that
motivates dissonance resolution (Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zanna, 1979).
For years dissonance research has been dealing with some of the more
difficult problems of psychology. Perhaps because of the relative vagueness
of the concepts involved, the research has not attracted the attention of many
modern psychologists. Here, we have defined dissonance at the genotypic
neuronal level as well as at the phenotypic psychological level. We have also
specified its relationship with awareness valence and with the self. The
original hypothesis of dissonance theory--that the negative valence resulting
from the functioning of self-dissonant elements motivates the resolution of
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such dissonance--may indeed be an important aspect of the causal loop
characterizing the interface between the mind and the brain.
Optimal-Level Theories
Optimal-level theorists concentrate on attempts to discover invariant
relationships between external stimulation and mental functioning. Wundt
(1874) was the first to propose a curve linking stimulus intensity and
affective states. Stimulus intensity up to a moderate level was assumed to be
pleasant, and beyond this optimal level, unpleasantness would increase with
increments in intensity.
During the 1950"s, evidence accumulated demonstrating that organisms
often seek dissonance and prefer it (see, e.g., Berlyne, 1960). This evidence
was difficult to explain in terms of the tension-reduction hypothesis of
consistency theories. How could dissonance be pleasant and unpleasant at the
same time? The optimal-level function seemed to provide an answer. Building
upon Wundt's original formulation, psychologists hypothesized that in order to
experience pleasantness, organisms would have to encounter something new
(something different from what they were accustomed to) but not too new (e.g.,
Hebb, 1949, p. 323). Based on this formulation, dissonance or discrepancy, as
it was called by Hebb (1949) and Haber (1958), was no longer exclusively
negative. Rather, discrepancies up to an optimal level would be pleasant;
those above it were assumed to be unpleasant.
While optimal-level theorists agreed that there was an optimal level,
there was widespread disagreement "on the mechanism by which optimization
proceeds" (Arkes & Garske, 1977, po 149). Some argued that the individual
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tries to optimize the amount of arousal (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Hebb, 1955).
Some argued that the individual seeks an optimal degree of psychological
complexity (e.g., Dorfman, 1965; Smith & Dorfman, 1975; Walker, 1973). Others
argued for an optimal amount of deviation from the adaptation level (e.g.,
Haber, 1958; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). And still others
proposed an optimal level of congruity (e.g., Hunt, 1971).
The observation, made by optimal-level theorists, that organisms often
seek external stimulation in the absence of any aversive biological or
acquired drives and in the absence of any overt or covert goals is an
important one. Important also is the realization that the explanation for
this must be sought in the very functioning of the organismic systems, and not
in the relational properties that hold abstract knowledge systems together.
However, we do not find the optimal-level function very informative. We
believe it is an artifact resulting from attempts to relate the organism to
the world at the wrong level of specificity, to map external stimulation
patterns to internal psychological patterns directly. This is probably why
the optimal-level research, in spite of its relatively long history, has not
managed to go beyond simple perceptual stimuli.
The functional view maintains that the locus of organism-environment
relationship lies at the genotypic neuronal level. It is at this level that
external energy patterns play their indispensable role of initiating
functioning in the neuronal elements, elements that are phylogenetically or
ontogenetically specialized to start functioning in the presence of such
energy patterns.
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Why do organisms seek external energy patterns? Without entering into
much detail, we will mention the elements that are necessary for putting
together an explanation in terms of the functional perspective:
1. Constant independent functioning of neuronal elements in the context
of the schema-of-the-moment is absolutely essential if an internally
consistent (i.e., positive) inherent self is to be maintained.
Recall that the inherent self was the totality of the experience (or
awareness pattern) of the moment generated by the functioning of
neuronal elements throughout the neuronal system. According to this
view, no simultaneous or independent functioning means no awareness
experience, and consequently, no self.
2. Endogenous sources of initiation--internal energy patterns--are, by
themselves, inadequate to keep the resolving schema-of-the-moment
constantly alive. This is because some of the elements that must
enter the "chain" of combination must depend on external energy
patterns in order to become functional.
The functional theory, therefore, not only can explain why organisms seek
external stimulation, but also implies that they must; that is, if the
inherent self is to survive.
Psychophysiological Theories
Like many optimal-level theories, psychophysiological models suggest that
affective functioning is mediated by the activity of the autonomic arousal
system. William James (1884), the famous American psychologist, and Carl
Lange (1885/1922), the Danish physiologist, defined emotions in terms of
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perceived changes in the activity of the sympathetic and motor systems. They
suggested that we are angry because our legs start to shake and our hearts
start to pound.
Evidence in support of the James-Lange theory comes from the research
with paraplegic or quadriplegic patients. These patients report feeling less
emotional after the damage to their spinal cord (Hohmann, 1966). They are
only capable of getting thinking mad or afraid but not shaking mad or afraid.
In 1927, Cannon leveled several arguments against the James-Lange theory.
He noted, for instance, that the same physiological changes in the rate of
functioning of the sympathetic or motor systems (rapid heart rate, etc.) occur
during a variety of emotional experiences. Any theory based on merely these
changes will fail to distinguish different emotions. Cannon hypothesized that
the origin of emotional experiences must be sought primarily in the activity
of the lower portions of the central nervous system.
According to a theory developed by Stanley Schachter and his associates
(Schachter, 1971; Schachter & Singer, 1962), the functioning of the
sympathetic arousal system and/or the activity of neurons located in the lower
brain centers are not sufficient to account for various emotional experiences.
Rather, the activity of other (cognitive) brain centers must also be
considered. Based on this view, arousal is a general functional state that
can be interpreted and labeled as different emotions depending on situational
circumstances. Evidence for Schachter's psychophysiological theory comes from
a controversial experiment conducted by Schachter and Singer (1962). In this
experiment, the same physiological state of arousal, induced by injection of
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epinephrine, was interpreted by some subjects as "anger" and by others as
"euphoria," depending on whether the subject watched a stooge act angrily or
euphorically. Schachter's theory is consistent with the present functional
view maintaining that an emotion is a nonspecific functional state created by
the totality of active neuronal elements of the moment, located at various
sections of the neuronal network.
Empirical Overview
The theories discussed above can lead to one general conclusion: Affect
(emotional experience) is a consequence of the functional interaction among
various dynamic mechanisms of mental functioning. The functional approach
argues that the causal loci for this interaction are physically unitary,
functionally autonomous, and distributed neuronal elements. Simultaneous and
independent functioning of these elements are responsible for the creation and
unitization of transient mental structures.
Among the advantages of the functional perspective is its explanatory
power. With only a few basic assumptions, it plausibly brings such
psychological phenomena as attention (broad or focused) and awareness
(explicit or implicit) under the control of the same mechanisms, namely,
simultaneous and independent functioning. Plausible solutions can also be
offered to traditionally controversial problems. As an example, consider the
question of localization of mental functions in the brain. Early
investigators tried to locate separate neural centers for such complex
behavior as reading English or French (Hinshelwood, 1900). Lashley's (1929)
classic experiment with rats demonstrated that it was the amount of brain
Affect
46
tissue destroyed, and not so much the destruction of specific areas, that
correlated with the animal's behavior. This led to the conclusion that the
brain acts as a mass and all areas are equipotential. More recent
neurophysiological research (e.g., Heath, 1964; Heath & Gallant, 1964; Olds &
Milner, 1954) has provided evidence supporting finer localizations.
If the functional view is correct, there can be no isomorphism between
mental or behavioral structures and neural structures, in the same fashion
that one would not expect to find individual genes or unique gene combinations
for whole bodily organs such as the lungs, for instance. Even the simplest
psychological patterns are created by the functioning of many neuronal
elements located at various areas of the brain. (For a discussion of how
"remote" communication among neuronal elements can take place, see Iran-Nejad
& Ortony, Note 2.) This indicates that removal of a particular element or a
particular local group of elements cannot be expected to eliminate any
specific behavior and only that behavior. Rather, removal of brain tissue
should have a gross effect on a host of behaviors.
Finally, for the sake of illustration, we will discuss some empirical
implications of the functional approach for research concerning the nature of
intrinsic motivation. Many psychologists have maintained that affective
valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) is the primary motivational factor.
Consistency theories, for instance, believe that resolution of inconsistency
is motivated by the unpleasantness that it generates. Optimal-level
theorists, like Berlyne, have suggested that the activity of some unitary
arousal system is the primary motivational factor by virtue of its effect on
Affect
47
the functioning of the pleasure/unpleasure system. The functional view, on
the other hand, implies that the primary source of intrinsic motivation must
also be sought in the simultaneous or independent functioning of distributed
neuronal constellations. This is because such functioning is the causal
origin of awareness valence, attention, the inherent self, and the acquired
concept of self.
First, independent functioning, together with simultaneous functioning,
is the sole perpetual creator of the inherent self--the totality of the
awareness experience of the moment. Without independent functioning the
inherent self ceases to exist; that is, the organism goes to sleep. The only
time this can happen is when endogenous and exogenous conditions are right for
the organism to do so. Otherwise, independent functioning (i.e., activation
of positive or self-consonant constellations and inhibition of negative or
self-dissonant constellations) must take place to keep the inherent self alive
and "happy." And, since endogenous sources of initiation of functioning are
often inadequate for continued promotion of independent functioning, the only
other real option for the organism is to engage in active or passive exposure
to external sources of initiation.
Secondly, it is through independent functioning that the organism can
become explicitly aware of the components of the acquired concept of self
(i.e., the immediate or long-term concerns and goals). Recall that it is
through independent functioning that interaction between the system as a whole
and its components (including those involved in the acquired concept of self)
is possible (see the section on the combinatorial aspect). No independent
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functioning of a particular component would mean no explicit awareness of it
and, consequently, there would be no way of "determining" the extent to which
that component is, for instance, consonant or dissonant with the self. Thus,
independent functioning is essential for the maintenance of both aspects of
the self. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that it is the primary
motivational mechanism.
If independent and simultaneous functioning are as important as the
functional view implies, then they must somehow manifest themselves in mental
experience. Are there any psychological experiences that could be assumed to
correspond to them? Surprise, excitement, suspense, curiosity, and
interestingness seem to be candidates, depending on the type of schema-of-
the-moment (i.e., resolved, resolving, etc.). There may also be others such
as the so-called "click" of comprehension. All of these seem to possess the
attention catching/holding quality they are expected to have. Furthermore,
they all seem to correlate with awareness as independent or simultaneous
functioning would necessitate. Therefore, they may indeed be psychological
manifestations of the functioning of distributed neuronal elements.
If interestingness, for example, is to be defined as an inherent
consequence of biological functioning, such a definition must be consistent
with what is known about the concept of interestingness. For instance, it is
generally agreed that both positive and negative experiences can be
interesting. To the extent that this is the case, one would expect
manipulations of independent functioning to be interesting regardless of
whether they involve positive or negative components. We have recently
gathered some data that support this hypothesis.
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The actual framework uses passages which consist of two parts: a stem
and an ending. Subjects read the stem, which contains/does not contain,
implicitly or explicitly, events that follow in an ending. In this fashion,
it is possible to present subjects with endings that are totally expected (at
one extreme), because they are also stated in the stem ("no" independent
functioning), totally unexpected (at the other extreme) because the stem does
not allow subjects to entertain the idea of the events in the ending (abrupt
independent functioning), or lie somewhere in between (gradual independent
functioning). Subjects can, then, rate their experience on various affective
scales immediately after they finish reading the ending.
Included among the rating scales were several measures of valence, an
interestingness scale, an empathy scale, and several measures of dissonance
(incongruity). A preliminary principle-components analysis showed that
interestingness, valence, and incongruity loaded on three separate factors,
indicating qualitative differences underlying judgments of these variables.
How does the functional model specify these underlying differences?
Incongruity differs from independent functioning in that the former involves
dissonant functioning. Independent functioning of a constellation means
harmonious (consonant) functioning of the elements of the constellation; and
subsequent simultaneous functioning means consonance with the schema-of-the-
moment. While dissonant (incongruous) functioning means just the opposite.
It is this harmonious functioning that allows the attention catching/holding
aspect that seems to be the basis for the judgment of interestingness. In
dissonant functioning attention fluctuates among the dissonant components and,
consequently, results in confusion.
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How does interestingness differ from valence? Consider a particular
local component of the schema-of-the-moment, say, a constellation in the
visual cortex. Independent functioning of this constellation means a change
in the visual cortex in the functioning of this constellation as compared to
the functioning of other components of the schema-of-the-moment in other
regions of the brain. There are two aspects to this change. There is the
attention catching/holding aspect: The very act of independent or
simultaneous functioning results in focal or broad attention and,
consequently, in the judgment of interestingness. The second aspect is the
awareness that the act of functioning is assumed to generate. This is the
basis for the judgment of valence. Thus, while attention (hence,
interestingness) is common to all instances of independent and simultaneous
functioning, awareness (hence, valence) is a property of the particular
functioning constellation.
By providing the basis for identifying and plausibly defining a host of
factors and mechanisms that are assumed to figure centrally in affective
functioning, we have presented a plausible characterization of affect. These
factors and mechanisms (e.g., valence, independent and simultaneous
functioning, specialization, resolution and dissolution) are independent of
particular knowledge structures and are, therefore, candidates for (or
manifestations of) domain-independent universal principles. This functional
view of cognitive/affective universals may be contrasted with the structural
approaches that hypothesize domain-specific universals such as universal story
schemata (e.g., Mandler, Scribner, Cole, & DeForest, 1980). To be sure,
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people from different cultures may share some sort of a schema for stories, in
the same way that people from most modern cultures may share a schema for
vehicles. However, we believe such domain-specific structures are not
suitable candidates for cognitive universals. People who lived more than a
hundred years ago had a perfectly normal cognitive system without schemata for
such novelties as the television, the telephone, or modern vehicles. By
contrast, pathological conditions could be suspected if the components of an
individual's neuronal system were incapable of demonstrating independent or
simultaneous functioning at the genotypic neuronal level, or if a person were
unable to experience curiosity, suspense, or awareness at the phenotypic
psychological level. It might be argued that pre-existing schemata or plans
are necessary for the experience of curiosity or suspense. But such
psychological experiences can be explained at least as clearly in terms of the
internal consistency of the components of the schema-of-the-moment, determined
by the functional properties of the participating elements.
Finally, we must say something about the role of structural analysis in a
functional model. In recent years, significant achievements have been made in
the analytical approaches to language and knowledge structures. The direct
goal of this research has been to develop structural representations,
consisting of frames and transformations.
The functional approach assumes that attempts at the analysis of
cognitive structures with the aim of building structural representations of
psychological validity can serve only at the expense of operating at the wrong
level of specificity. Knowledge structures are unanalyzable and cannot be
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specified to the extent that a finite set of precise algorithms (of the nature
of multiplication rules, for instance) would require in order to allow the
construction of a formal structural description. This is especially true of
global affective structures.
In the functional approach, structural analysis is only an intermediate
tool. It takes the form of semi-arbitrary, heuristic, rather than precise,
algorithmic analyses. While such heuristic rules may even have indispensable
practical value, they are never attributed psychological status. Their value
is determined to the extent that they serve to clarify the nature of
independently specified functional properties of the nervous system.
Functional analysis and structural analysis go hand in hand, but the former
comes first.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents a point of view on affect that starkly contrasts with
structural theories of emotion. The functional view maintains that emotional
experiences must be described in terms of functional properties of underlying
neuronal elements and not in terms of properties of abstract emotional
structures.
Structural theories have been particularly slow in dealing with the
problem of affect. We argued that this may very well be because they cannot
do so. This argument was supported by the fact that the majority of existing
theories of emotion are essentially functional and by the fact that the
recently emerging structural theories of affect often choose to ignore this
rich wealth of theoretical and empirical knowledge.
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While few psychologists would doubt that the nervous system is the actual
site and the creator of our thoughts and emotions, there is a great deal of
reluctance in psychological theorizing to become involved with concepts
bearing on the nervous system. It is often argued that we do not know enough,
or we must solve simple problems first. But how do we know when we know
enough or what is simple? In 1884, William James criticized psychologists for
ignoring affect, pointing out "that the matter lay for them among the problems
of the future, only to be taken up after the simpler ones of the present have
been definitely solved" (p. 188). In 1980, Minsky found it necessary to warn
again that "feelings and viewpoints . . . [may actually be] the simpler
things" (p. 118).
We feel that what currently separates psychological and neurological
concepts is the absence of a plausible language to bridge the gap. We think
the functional approach has the potential for providing this language.
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Footnotes
IThe analyzability of mental structures has often been called into
question. Polanyi (1958) has argued that (tacit) knowledge can almost never
be formalized, and Bartlett (1932) states that affective structures are "very
hard to describe in more elementary psychological terms" (p. 206). Similarly,
Huey (1908) points out that "the consciousness of meaning itself belongs in
the main to that group of mental states, the feelings, which I regard with
Wundt as unanalyzable" (p. 163; also see Minsky, 1980, p. 118 quoted below).
2The limit on such independent functioning or focusing is the individual
neuron, when some single neuron manages to change its rate of functioning
singly. Though the latter is in principle possible, it presumably never
occurs. In reality, several (hundred) neurons function at any given time to
create an idea and/or to focus on a certain aspect of it in a particular
region of the brain; ideas are not created locally, while images probably are.
Neuronal elements creating a particular idea or meaning are distributed in
various areas throughout the nervous system.
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